The Complexity of Probabilistic Justification Logic by Kokkinis, Ioannis
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
04
10
0v
1 
 [c
s.L
O]
  1
4 A
ug
 20
17
The Complexity of Probabilistic Justification Logic
Ioannis Kokkinis
LORIA, CNRS-University of Lorraine, Nancy, France
ioannis.kokkinis@loria.fr
September 23, 2018
Abstract
Probabilistic justification logic is a modal logic with two kind of modalities: prob-
ability measures and explicit justification terms. We present a tableau procedure that
can be used to decide the satisfiability problem for this logic in polynomial space.
We show that this upper complexity bound is tight.
1 Introduction
Following [9] we can define a probabilistic version of a base logic by enriching the language
of the base logic with probabilistic operators. The probabilistic operators create formulas
of the form P≥sA which read as “A holds with probability at least s”. The models of these
probabilistic logics are probability spaces which have models of the base logic as states. In
order to obtain a sound and complete axiomatization the usual axioms for probability are
combined with the axioms of the base logic [9].
Artemov developed the first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs (LP), to provide
intuitionistic logic with a classical provability semantics [1, 2]. In [2] it was proved that
any theorem of modal logic S4 can be translated into a theorem of LP by replacing any
occurrence of the modal operator  with an appropriate explicit justification term and
that any theorem in LP can be translated into a theorem in S4 by replacing any occurrence
of a justification term with a . In the same way explicit counterparts for several modal
logics were found [3]. For example the justification logic J is the explicit counterpart of
the minimal modal logic K.
In [7] a probabilistic justification logic, PPJ, is defined over the basic justification logic
J [3]. In this paper we present a tableau procedure that can be used to decide the satisfi-
ability problem in PPJ. This procedure uses a rule that is applied to all the formulas that
appear in the scope of some probabilistic operator in a tableau branch. The rule creates
exponentially many branches, however by applying a theorem from the theory of linear
systems we show that only polynomially many branches are needed in order to decide the
satisfiability of a given formula. This way we can decide the satisfiability problem for PPJ
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in polynomial space. We show that our upper bound is tight via a reduction from modal
logic D, which is the modal logic that is complete with respect to serial Kripke structures.
2 A Probabilistic Logic over Classical Propositional
Logic
Let Prop be a countable set of atomic propositions. The logic LPP1 is defined in [9] over
the language LLPP1 :
A ::= p | P≥sA | ¬A | A ∧A
where1 s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] and p ∈ Prop. We also use the following abbreviations:
P<sA ≡ ¬P≥sA , P≤sA ≡ P≥1−s¬A , P>sA ≡ ¬P≤sA and P=sA ≡ P≥sA ∧ P≤sA .
The axiom schemata and the derivation rules of the logic LPP1 are presented in Table 1.
Axiom (PI) corresponds to the fact that the probability of truthfulness of every formula is
at least 0. Axioms (WE) and (LE) describe some properties of inequalities. Axioms (DIS)
and (UN) correspond to the additivity of probabilities for disjoint events. The rule (CE)
is the probabilistic analogue of the modal necessitation rule and the rule (ST) informally
says that if the probability of a formula is arbitrarily close to s then it is at least s. (ST)
corresponds to the Archimedean property of the real numbers.
Axiom Schemata:
(P) finitely many axioms schemata for classical propositional logic
(PI) ⊢ P≥0A
(WE) ⊢ P≤rA→ P<sA, where s > r
(LE) ⊢ P<sA→ P≤sA
(DIS) ⊢ P≥rA ∧ P≥sB ∧ P≥1¬(A ∧ B)→ P≥min(1,r+s)(A ∨ B)
(UN) ⊢ P≤rA ∧ P<sB → P<r+s(A ∨B), where r + s ≤ 1
Derivation Rules:
(MP) if T ⊢ A and T ⊢ A→ B then T ⊢ B
(CE) if ⊢ A then ⊢ P≥1A
(ST) if T ⊢ A→ P≥s− 1
k
B for every integer k ≥ 1
s
and s > 0 then T ⊢ A→ P≥sB
Table 1: Axiom Schemata and Derivation Rules of LPP1
A probability space is a triple 〈W,H, µ〉, where W is a non-empty set of states, H ⊆
P(W ) (P stands for powerset) is closed under finite union and complementation and µ :
H → [0, 1] such that µ(W ) = 1 and for any disjoint U and V in H , µ(U∪V ) = µ(U)+µ(V ).
1Q denotes the set of rational numbers.
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The models for LPP1 are probability spaces where the states contain truth assignments and
probability spaces (so that we can deal with iterated probabilities).
Definition 1 (LPP1-Model). An LPP1-model is a quintuple M = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 where:
1. U is a non-empty set of objects called worlds;
2. W,H, µ and v are functions, which have U as their domain, such that for every w ∈ U :
〈Ww, Hw, µw〉 is a probability space with Ww ⊆ U and vw : Prop→ {T, F}, where T
(F) stand for true (false).
Definition 2 (Satisfiability in an LPP1-model). LetM = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 be an LPP1-model.
Satisfiability is defined as follows (the propositional cases are treated classically):
M,w |= p ⇐⇒ vw(p) = T for p ∈ Prop ;
M,w |= P≥sB ⇐⇒
(
µw
(
[A]M,w
)
≥ s
)
, where [A]M,w = {u ∈ Ww | M,u |= A} .
Let M = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 be an LPP1-model. M will be called measurable if for every
w ∈ U and for every A ∈ LLPP1 , [A]M,w ∈ Hw. In the rest of the paper we restrict ourselves
to measurable models. LPP1,Meas denotes the class of LPP1-measurable models.
Soundness and strong completeness for LPP1 with respect to LPP1,Meas is proved in [9].
Assume that A1, . . . , Ak are the subformulas of some A ∈ LLPP1 . A formula of the form
±A1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±Ak, where ±Ai is either Ai or ¬Ai, will be called an atom of A. In an atom
the order of the conjuncts does not matter. So, two atoms are considered the same if they
have the same conjuncts. |A| is defined as the number of symbols that are used in order
to write A (where all rational numbers are assumed to have size 1). For A ∈ LLPP1 , ||A||
is the biggest size of a rational number that appears in A (where the size of a rational
number is equal to the sum of the lengths of the binary representations of its numerator
and denominator, when the rational number is written as an irreducible fraction).
As we mentioned in the introduction, a well known theorem from the theory of linear
systems is necessary for our results. We present this theorem as Theorem 3. This result is
stated (and proved) for the purposes of probabilistic logic as Theorem 5.1.5. in [6]. The
interesting part of Theorem 3 is proved in [4, p. 145].
Theorem 3. Let S be a linear system of n variables and of r linear equalities and/or
inequalities with integer coefficients each of size at most l. Assume that the vector
x = x1, . . . , xn is a solution of S such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, xi ≥ 0. Then there
is a vector x∗ = x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n with the following properties:
(1) x∗ is a solution of S and at most r entries of x∗ are positive;
(2) for all i, x∗i is a non-negative rational number with size bounded by 2 ·
(
r · l + r ·
log2(r) + 1
)
;
(3) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if x∗i > 0 then xi > 0.
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Now we can prove the small model property for LPP1.
Theorem 4 (Small Model Property for LPP1). If A is LPP1,Meas-satisfiable then it is
satisfiable in a model M = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 that satisfies the following properties:
(1) |U | ≤ 2|A| and in every world of U exactly one atom of A holds.
(2) For every w ∈ U the following holds:
(a) Ww = U and Hw is the powerset of U .
(b) For every u ∈ Ww, µw({u}) ≤ 2·
(
|A|·||A||+|A|·log2(|A|)+1
)
and µw({u}) ∈ Q.
(c) For every V ∈ Hw: µw(V ) =
∑
u∈V µw({u}) .
(d) The number of u’s such that µw({u}) > 0, is at most |A|.
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 5.3.6 of [6] a model for A that satisfies the conditions of the
theorem is constructed. The most interesting property of the small model is (2)d, which
can be proved by an application of Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. The LPP1,Meas-satisfiability problem is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. Since probability spaces are non-empty sets it makes sense to draw a reduction from
modal logic D, which is complete for serial Kripke structures. Let A be a modal formula
and let f(A) be the LLPP1-formula that is obtained by replacing any occurrence of  in A
with P≥1. We will prove that A is satisfiable iff f(A) is LPP1,Meas-satisfiable.
Assume that A is satisfiable. Then A is satisfiable in a finite model [5]. We can create
an LPP1,Meas-model where the probability space of each world w consists of the worlds
accessible to w and w assigns a uniform probability to each of these worlds. Then we can
prove that f(A) is satisfied in this LPP1,Meas-model.
Assume that f(A) is satisfiable. Then it is satisfiable in a model that has the properties
of Theorem 4. We define a Kripke model where u is accessible from w, if µw({u}) > 0.
Then we can prove that A is satisfiable in this Kripke model.
3 Adding Justifications
Justification logics are modal logics that use explicit terms instead of the modality . The
terms are constructed according to the grammar t ::= c | x | (t · t) | !t where c is a constant
and x is a variable. Tm denotes the set of all terms. For t ∈ Tm and any non-negative
integer n we define: !0t := t and !n+1t := ! (!nt). The language of justification logic, LJ, is
defined by the grammar A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧A | t : A where t ∈ Tm and p ∈ Prop. For this
presentation we take (J), i.e. ⊢ u : (A → B) → (v : A → u · v : B) as the only axiom of
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the logic J. The logic J is defined2 by taking a system for classical propositional logic, the
axiom J and the rule (AN!):
⊢ !nc : !n−1c : · · · : !c : c : A, where c is a constant, A is an axiom-instance and n ∈ N .
Semantics for J are given by M-models.
Definition 6 (M-model). An M-model is a pair 〈v, E〉, where v : Prop → {T, F} and
E : Tm→ P(LJ) such that for every u, v ∈ Tm, for a constant c and A ∈ LJ we have:
1.
(
A→ B ∈ E(u) and A ∈ E(v)
)
=⇒ B ∈ E(u · v) ;
2. if c is a constant, A an axiom and n ∈ N then !n−1c : !n−2c : · · · :!c : c : A ∈ E(!nc).
The language of probabilistic justification logic is defined as a combination of LJ and
LLPP1 : A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧ A | t : A | P≥sA. So PPJ [7] is defined by taking the axioms
and rules of LPP1 together with the axiom and rules of J ((AN!) can now be applied to
probabilistic axioms instances too). A measurable model for probabilistic justification logic
is defined by replacing the truth assignment in Definition 1 with an M-model. The class
of measurable models is PPJ,Meas. Satisfiability in PPJ,Meas is defined by adding the line
M,w |= t : A ⇐⇒ A ∈ Ew(t) in Definition 2, where Ew is the evidence function that
corresponds to the M-model assigned to the world w. Soundness and completeness of
probabilistic logics with respect to measurable models is proved in [6]. Theorem 4 holds
for PPJ as well [6].
4 The Tableau Procedure
Our tableaux are trees where the nodes are formulas prefixed with world and truth signs.
So, the node w T A (w F A) intuitively means that formula A is true (resp. false) at world
w. A branch is a path that starts at a result of an application of the rule prob (defined
later) or at the root and ends at the premise of an application of the rule prob or at a leaf.
A branch is called closed if it contains both w T A and w F A for some A. Otherwise it is
called open. A branch is called complete if no rule is applicable in this branch. Otherwise
it is called incomplete. The only rule that can create new worlds in our tableaux is the
rule prob. For this reason we can assign a world to each branch (of course the same world
may be assigned to several branches). So, bw denotes a branch where all the formulas are
prefixed with w. We will use the abbreviation “w T A” (“w F A”) to denote that the
node w T A (w T A) appears in the tableau. Our tableau rules are the rules for classical
propositional logic and the rule prob:
2This paper aims at illustrating the combination of justification logic and probabilistic logic. Therefore,
we consider it useful to study the smallest possible framework. As a consequence we present a variant of
logic J without the operator + and with the maximal constant specification. Other features of justification
logic, like the term operator +, other justification axioms etc. can be added to our framework without
complications.
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bwprob
w.1 T ± B11 ∧ . . . ∧ ±B1m | · · · | w.n T ±Bn1 ∧ . . . ∧ ±Bnm
In rule prob the w.i’s are new world prefixes and for all i, j, “w T P≥sijBij” or
“w F P≥sijBij”. In our tableaux we treat formulas starting with a justification term
as atomic formulas. In other words, no rule can be applied to a formula of the form t : A.
The tableau procedure consists of two parts: first we apply the rules and then we mark
worlds and applications of prob satisfiable. Assume that A is a formula that we want to
test for satisfiability. We take w T A as the root of the tableau and then we apply the
following steps:
1. Apply the propositional rules for as long as possible. If there exists an open branch
that contains w T P≥sB or w F P≥sB for some s and B then we go to step 2.
Otherwise stop.
2. Apply the probabilistic tableau rule to every open branch. Then go to step 1.
The second part of the tableau procedure consists of a method for marking worlds and
applications of prob satisfiable. In order to mark worlds satisfiable we traverse the tree
from the leaves to the root and we make sure that the justification and the probabilistic
restrictions are satisfied. In order to check the probabilistic constraints we have to mark
applications of prob as satisfiable as well.
Marking Worlds Satisfiable. Let bw be one of the branches that correspond to
world w. In order to check that “justification constraints” hold in bw we have to extend
the satisfiability algorithm for justification logic J [8] in the probabilistic context. The
algorithm of [8] checks that if “w F t : A” then A /∈ E(t) where 〈v, E〉 is the minimum
M-model that is defined by the formulas u : B such that “w T u : B”. This algorithm
uses a procedure for unifying axiom schemata of justification logic. In order to extend this
algorithm to the probabilistic setting we have to extend the unification to probabilistic
axiom schemata. These axioms come with some linear side conditions (see Table 1), so
their unification will create a linear system. The unification algorithm then succeeds if this
linear system is satisfiable. For more details see Lemma 5.3.3 of [6]. Now w will be marked
satisfiable if there exists an open bw such that the extended algorithm for justification
satisfiability holds and either it is a complete branch or it ends in an application of prob
and this application is marked satisfiable.
Marking Applications of prob Satisfiable. Let ρ be an application of the rule
prob on branch bw. We associate variables xi with every world w.i, even if wi is marked
not satisfiable. The xi corresponds to the probabilities that world w assigns to wi in a
small model for A (i.e. xi = µw({w.i}) in the sense of Theorem 4). We mark ρ satisfiable
if the following linear system is solvable:
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n∑
i=1
xi = 1
(∀1 ≤ i ≤ n)
[
xi ≥ 0
]
if “w T P≥sC” then
∑
{i|“w.i T C”}
xi ≥ s
if “w F P≥sC” then
∑
{i|“w.i T C”}
xi < s .
If the initial formula A belongs to a world that is marked satisfiable then we return
satisfiable. After an application of a propositional rule the length of the formula decreases.
After an application of the probabilistic rule the nesting depth of probabilistic operators
decreases. Hence, our tableau procedure terminates. By the procedure of marking worlds
satisfiable and by Theorem 4 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 7. Let A be a PPJ-formula. The tableau method returns A is satisfiable iff A is
satisfiable in a measurable model.
Theorem 8. The satisfiability problem for PPJ is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The lower bound follows from Theorem 5. The upper bound follows by the fact
that we can traverse the tableau for probabilistic justification logic in a depth first fashion
by reusing space. Whether a world w will be marked satisfiable depends on the worlds
that appear below it in the tableau. We only need a polynomial number of bits that
can be reused in order to decide the satisfiability of the linear systems and justification
constraints. A complication arises since rule prob creates exponentially many worlds.
However, because of Theorem 4(2)d in every application of rule prob we can guess a linear
number of branches to which we will assign non-zero probability. We conclude that the
depth first search operates in non deterministic polynomial space.
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